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Abstract
The notions of organized crime and terrorism have an old and rich history around
the globe. Researchers and practitioners have been studying events and phenomena
related to these notions for a long time. There are pointers in the literature in which
it is misleading to see the unfair comparison between terrorist and criminal
networks with the argument that all actors involved in these networks are simply
evil individuals. In this paper, we conduct a systematic study of the operational
structure of such networks from a network science perspective. We highlight some
of the major differences between them and support our hypothesis with analytical
evidence. We hope our work will impact current and future endeavors in counter
terrorism, especially within the cyber realm, inside the United States of America
and across our allied nations.
1. Introduction
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines organized crime groups as selfperpetuating associations of individuals who operate, wholly or in part, by illegal
means and irrespective of geography. They constantly seek to obtain power,
influence, and monetary gains. There is no single structure under which these
groups function; they vary from hierarchies to clans, networks, and cells, and may
evolve into other structures. These groups are typically insular and protect their
activities through corruption, violence, international commerce, complex
communication mechanisms, and an organizational structure exploiting national
boundaries (FBI, 2020).
With few exceptions, criminal groups have economic gain as primary goal,
and they employ an array of lawful and illicit schemes to generate profit. Crimes
such as drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering,
firearms trafficking, illegal gambling, extortion, counterfeit goods, cultural
property smuggling, and cybercrime are keystones within criminal enterprises. The
vast sums of money involved can compromise legitimate economies and have a
direct impact on governments through the corruption of public officials.
Criminal groups, often called transnational organized crime (TOC) groups,
encompass both the Eastern and Western hemispheres and include persons with
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ethnic or cultural ties to Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. These groups,
however, are able to target victims and execute their schemes from anywhere in the
world; thus, the extent of their presence within a particular area does not necessarily
reflect the degree of the threat they pose.
With the increase of technology available around the world, TOC groups
are more commonly incorporating cyber techniques into their illicit activities, either
committing cybercrimes themselves or using cyber tools to facilitate other unlawful
acts. Phishing, Internet auction fraud, and advanced fee fraud schemes allow
criminals to target certain countries without being present in the country.
Technology also enables TOC groups to engage in traditional criminal activity,
such as illegal gambling, but with a greater reach through use of the Internet and
offshore servers, thus expanding their global impact.
Criminal groups are engaged in significant criminal activities. According
to Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1961 (1), these activities include:
bribery, counterfeiting, embezzlement of union funds, mail fraud, wire fraud,
money laundering, obstruction of justice, murder for hire, drug trafficking,
prostitution, sexual exploitation of children, alien smuggling, trafficking in
counterfeit goods, theft and transportation of stolen property, etc.
There are a lot of transnational organized crime groups worldwide.
Geographically, they are mainly classified as African TOC groups, Asian TOC
groups, Balkan TOC groups, Eurasian TOC groups, Middle Eastern TOC groups,
and Italian TOC groups. The latter ones are probably the most notorious due to their
long history since the 1800s; there are four active groups: Cosa Nostra (Sicilian
Mafia), Camorra, ’Ndrangheta, and Sacra Corona Unita. They are also known to
collaborate with other international organized crime groups from all over the world
to carry out their criminal activities.
When it comes to the definition of terrorism, the FBI makes a subtle
distinction between international and domestic fronts. On one hand, international
terrorism is defined as violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or
groups who are inspired by, or associated with, designated foreign terrorist
organizations or nations (state-sponsored). On the other hand, domestic terrorism
is defined as violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups to
further ideological goals stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a
political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature.
Of particular interest to us is the notion of cyber-terrorism as defined by
Denning in (Denning, 2000): “Cyber-terrorism is the convergence of terrorism and
cyberspace. It is generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats of attack
against computers, networks, and the information stored therein when done to
intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social
objectives. Further, to qualify as cyber-terrorism, an attack should result in violence
against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks
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that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination,
or severe economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against critical
infrastructures could be acts of cyber-terrorism, depending on their impact.”
Terrorists' activities via cyberspace include creating websites/blogs,
communication via email, discussion via chat rooms, e-transactions (e-commerce/
e-banking), using search engines to collect data and information, phishing/ hacking,
viruses, malicious code, etc. As an example of such activities, we consider the
website www.anshar.net created by Noordin Mohammed Top in Indonesia.
Established for propaganda purposes, this website published successful terrorist
attacks, recruited fellow prospective soldiers, and distributed training material for
agents.
Both TOC and terrorist groups are involved in criminal work across the
globe, the spectrum of which may vary from an instance to another. They are
dubbed the name “networks” in the literature and the media alike. In (Campana,
2016), the author discusses two distinct perspectives on networks, namely a
substantive approach that views networks as a distinct form of organization, and an
instrumental one that interprets networks as a collection of nodes and attributes.
Given the ongoing relentless effort of the United States Government (USG)
in analyzing, understanding, and responding to the terrorist threat, and given the
general public’s abuse of the term “networks” in daily life, it begs the following
question: Are terrorist networks just glorified criminal cells?
This paper addresses the above question from a network science perspective.
Network science is an academic field which studies complex networks such as
telecommunication networks, computer networks, biological networks, cognitive
networks, and social networks. We use publicly available data pertaining to 14 total
networks: 8 terrorist networks and 6 criminal networks. All our data are retrieved
from the John Jay & ARTIS Transnational Terrorism (JJATT) database (John Jay
& ARTIS, 2009). We answer the main question in the negative: namely, we refute
the idea that terrorist networks operate like criminal ones by highlighting the
structural differences between the two types of organizations. We hope this will
lead to a fundamental segregation when dealing with current and future cases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After this short
introduction, we define the basics of graph theory and some tools for the statistical
characterization and classification of large networks in the preliminaries section. In
Section 3, we review the most relevant and up to date literature that deals with
terrorist and criminal networks. Section 4 discusses the details of our methodology
for analyzing criminal and terrorist networks separately. We record our findings in
the results section and then contrast the main similarities and differences in the
discussion section. We conclude the paper with a short summary and future
recommendations.
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2. Preliminaries
Networks are ubiquitous. The existence of society depends upon a variety of
complex networks covering different domains. In the physical realm, they include
highways, railroads, the air transportation network, the global shipping network,
power grids, water distribution networks, supply networks, global financial
networks, telephone systems, and the Internet. In the biological realm, they include
genetic expression networks, metabolic networks, ant colonies, food webs, river
basins, and the global ecological web of Earth itself. In the social realm, they
include governments, businesses, universities, social clubs, churches, school
systems, and military organizations. In this section we provide the basic notions
and notations needed to describe networks. Needless to say, the expert reader can
freely skip this section and use it later as a reference.
The terms graphs and networks are used indistinctly in the literature. The
only nuance is that the term graph usually refers to the abstract mathematical
concept of nodes and edges, while the term network refers to real-world objects in
which nodes represent entities of some system and edges represent the relationships
between them.
We adopt a natural framework for the rigorous mathematical description of
networks, namely graph theory. Graph theory is a vast field of mathematics that
can be traced back to the seminal work of Leonhard Euler in solving the Konigsberg
bridges problem in 1736 (West, 1996) and (Agnarsson & Greenlaw, 2007). We will
give some formal definitions below. In most of this section, we follow the
terminology established in (Newman, 2010) and (Barabasi, 2016) and we
encourage the reader to refer to these books for further details on the topic.
Let V = {v1, v2, …, vn} be a finite set of elements and V × V the set of all
ordered pairs {vi,vj} of elements of V. A relation on the set V is any subset E of V
× V. A simple graph is a pair G = (V, E), where V is a finite set of nodes (or vertices)
and E is a relation on V such that {vi,vj} is in E implies that {vj,vi} is in E and vi ≠
vj, that is G has no loops. The elements of E are called edges or links, we shall
denote them as E = {e1, e2, …, em}.
A weighted graph is a quadruple G = (V, E, W, φ) where the sets V and E
are as above, W = {w1, w2, …, ws} is a set of weights (i.e., real numbers) and φ: E
→ W is a weight function, that is, a surjective mapping that assigns a weight to
each edge. In our work, we assume the weights are natural numbers. This means
that if the weight between two nodes is equal to k, then there are k edges joining
the two nodes. When the weight of each edge is 1, we call G an unweighted graph
or simply a graph.
If an edge e joins two nodes vi and vj, then we say that vi and vj are adjacent
and they are incident to e. The simplest characteristic of a node is its degree, which
is defined as the number of nodes adjacent to it. The adjacency matrix A = (aij) of
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a weighted graph G is an n × n array (n being the number of vertices) defined as: aij
= φ({vi,vj}), if {vi,vj} is in E; and 0 otherwise.
Note that for a simple undirected graph, the adjacency matrix is symmetric
and the entries on the main diagonal are all equal to zero. Figure 1 shows an
example of a simple graph with 5 vertices along with the corresponding adjacency
matrix.

Figure 1: A graph and its adjacency matrix
In a graph G = (V, E), a path from a node vi to a node vj is a collection of
ordered vertices {vi, vi+1, …, vj-1, vj} in V and a collection of ordered edges {(vi,vi+1),
(vi+1,vi+2), …, (vj-1,vj)} in E. The length of a path is the number of edges traversed
along the path. A shortest path, or a geodesic path, from node a vi to a node vj is a
path of shortest length. A cycle is a closed path, i.e., a path in which vi = vj.
We say that a graph is connected if there is a path between any pair of nodes
in the graph. A component of a graph is a connected subgraph. A tree is a connected
graph that has no cycles. One can easily derive that for a tree, there is a unique path
between any two given nodes. Equivalently, the deletion of any edge breaks a tree
into disconnected components. In the case there is a parent node, or root, from
which the whole tree arises, then it is called a rooted tree. The nodes at the bottom
that are connected to only one other node are called leaves.
The simplest characteristic of a node is its degree, which is defined as the
number of nodes adjacent to it. For directed graphs, the distinction is made between
the in-degree and the out-degree of a node. The former is the number of edges
pointing in the direction of the node, while the latter is the number of edges going
out of the node. The average degree of an undirected/directed graph is simply the
arithmetic mean of the degrees of all nodes.
The diameter of a graph G = (V, E) is the maximum shortest path length in
G. It simply measures the minimum number of edges needed to connect the two
most distant nodes in G. The average shortest path length is the average value over
all the possible pairs of vertices in the graph. The density of a graph is the ratio of
the number of edges to the maximum such number, this maximum number being
n*(n – 1)/2. We say that a graph is sparse if D <<< 1, and dense if D ~ 1 (realworld networks are sparse in general).
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Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph. The degree distribution pk is the
probability that a randomly chosen node has degree k. Such a distribution plays an
important role in the characterization of a network since it provides information
about the connectivity and the topology of the underlying graph.
The clustering coefficient of a node measures the likelihood that the
adjacent vertices to this node are connected to each other. There are two different
definitions for the clustering coefficient in the literature, so the comparison of such
coefficients among different graphs must use the same measure. The first definition,
often referred to as the local clustering coefficient, is the ratio of the number of
edges between the neighbors of the node and the maximum number of such possible
edges. The second definition, often referred to as the global clustering coefficient,
is the ratio of the number of triangles in the graph (cycles of length 3) to the number
of connected triples (paths of length 2).
As a numerical illustration for the non-expert reader, we consider the graph
in Figure 1. Recall that G is a graph with five nodes and six edges. The degree of
node 1 is 3 since there are 3 edges attached to it. The path 0 – 1 – 3 – 4 is a path
between nodes 0 and 4, but the shortest such path is 0 – 2 – 4. The diameter of the
graph is 2 since it is possible to get from any node to any other node in 2 steps. The
density of the graph is 6/10 = 0.6 since there are 6 edges and the maximum number
of possible edges on a graph with 5 vertices is 10. The average degree of the graph
is (2+3+3+2+2)/5=2.4 obtained by averaging the degrees of all nodes in the graph.
3. Related work
In the wake of the increase in the number of groups engaging in covert and illegal
activities and the threat they pose across the world, social network analysis has
emerged as a main tool to examine criminal and terrorist networks. In this section,
we pinpoint some of the most recent literature pertaining to the topic at large.
In the paper (Morselli, Giguère, & Petit, 2007), the authors demonstrate that
there exists a consistent trade-off facing participants in any criminal network
between organizing for efficiency or security, i.e., participants collectively pursue
an objective while keeping the action leading to that goal concealed. The distinction
is most salient when comparing terrorist with criminal enterprise networks: terrorist
networks are ideologically driven, while criminal enterprises pursue monetary ends.
Using exploratory research on networks of terrorist cells and electronic surveillance
transcripts of a drug importation network, their analyses show how these opposing
trade-offs emerge in criminal group structures.
The article (White, Porter, & Mazerolle, 2013) explores patterns of terrorist
activity over the period from 2000 through 2010 across three target countries:
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Using self-exciting point process models,
the authors create interpretable and replicable metrics for three key terrorism
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concepts: risk, resilience and volatility. Analysis of the data shows significant and
important differences in these concepts between the three countries. This makes
such concepts into benchmark indicators for terrorist activity in a given country.
The authors in (Lantz & Hutchison, 2015) examine the characteristics of the
most successful co-offender groups, the relationship between membership in these
co-offender groups and individual criminal careers, and the impact of changing
network structure, in the form of the arrest of co-offenders, on the criminal careers
of connected co-offenders. They find that group participation rate reduces the
effects of co-offender group size on group offending span, and that group ties are
associated with individual offender persistence.
The research work in (Zech & Gabbay, 2016) emphasizes the importance
of relational analysis and provides a variety of concepts, theories, and analytical
tools to better understand questions related to militant group behavior and outcomes
of terrorism and insurgent violence. The authors investigate how differences in
network structure lead to divergent outcomes with respect to political processes
such as militant group infighting, their strategic use of violence, or how politically
salient variables affect the evolution of militant cooperative networks.
In studying the structural and functional changes in an Australian drug
trafficking network across time to determine ways in which such networks form
and evolve, the authors in (Bright, Koskinen, Holloway, Steglich, & Stadfeld,
2018) apply a stochastic actor-oriented model to explain the dynamics of the
network across time. They find that actors do not seek to create an efficient network
that is highly centralized at the expense of security. Rather, actors strive to optimize
security through triadic closure, building trust, and protecting themselves and actors
in close proximity through the use of brokers that offer access to the rest of the
network.
Finally, a study (Ünal, 2019) on five narco-terror and five illicit drug
networks in the Turkish context was able to identify and compare their approach to
the security-efficiency tradeoff. Networks from both camps are structurally more
efficiency driven; they are denser with more direct ties. Generally clustered into
sub-groups attached to networks’ cores and peripheries, they reflect coreness,
where key players act in pivotal positions with high power, centrality, and
brokerage to efficiently control and coordinate network activities.
4. Methodology
Centrality is arguably the most popular operational concept used by social network
analysts. Node centrality measures tell us how the nodes within a network are
positioned. This section is divided into two parts: first, we give an overview of the
main centrality measures used in the literature, then we elaborate on the data sets
we employ for our validation process.
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By definition, centrality aims to capture the notion of “importance” of a
node in a network. There are plenty of centrality measures in the literature and
efficient algorithms to compute them for large networks. We will discuss below
some of the most commonly used ones.
Perhaps the most natural centrality measure for a node in a network is
simply its degree or degree centrality, i.e., the number of nodes adjacent to it. Nodes
with high degree centrality are those that attract a high concentration of direct
connectivity within a network. It is a local indicator of a node's importance and
does not take into consideration the global characteristics of the graph.
The betweenness centrality measures the extent to which a node lies on
paths between other nodes. It introduces the concept that it is not the quantity but
the quality of connections that matters more. Said differently, betweenness
centrality measures the extent to which a node mediates relationships between other
nodes by its position along paths within the network: the greater a node is located
along the paths in the network, the higher its betweenness centrality is.
The eigenvector centrality measures the influence a node has in the network.
It relies on the assumption that some nodes are central because they have a high
degree of direct contacts and because these direct contacts are themselves in direct
contact with high degree nodes in the same network. In other words, eigenvector
centrality measures the extent to which a node is connected to other nodes that are
high in degree centrality in the network.
In general, it is very hard to collect data sets pertaining to the criminal and
terrorist realms. For our work, we resorted to publicly available data sets of 8
terrorist networks and 6 criminal networks (John Jay & ARTIS, 2009). Below we list
these sets and provide some background on them. Note that the number of actors in
these networks ranges between 20-50 each. The terrorist networks are:
• 17 November Greece Bombing data set refers to the 17 November
Revolutionary Organization, a Marxist urban guerrilla organization
operating in Greece. The data refers to the specific temporal window which
runs from 1975 to 2002. During these years, the group has been responsible
for several violent acts such as assassinations, kidnappings, and symbolic
attacks on government offices.
• Australian Embassy Bombing, Indonesia, 2004 data set is a time series that
treats specific attacks as endpoints and depicts the evolution of relations
between individuals indirectly and directly associated with the Australian
Embassy bombing.
• Bali Bombing 2005 data set is a time series that treats specific attacks as
endpoints and depicts the evolution of relations between individuals
indirectly and directly associated with the 2005 Bali bombing by Jemaah
Islamiyah.
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•
•
•
•

•

•

•

•
•

•
•

Christmas Eve Bombings, Indonesia, 2000 data set is a time series that
depicts the evolution of relations between individuals indirectly and directly
associated with the 2000 Christmas Eve bombing.
Hamburg Cell 9/11, 2001 data set is a time series that relates individuals
indirectly and directly associated with the sleeper Al Qaeda cell in Hamburg
around the time of the 9/11 bombings.
Jakarta Bombing 2009 data set is a time series that describes the attack on
the JW Marriott and the Ritz-Carlton Hotels in Setiabudi, South Jakarta in
2009.
Mali Terrorist Network data set refers to a terrorist network operating in the
Sahel-Sahara region and describes relationships between Islamists and
Tuareg rebels during the Malian conflict. The data is extracted from a
selection of newspaper articles published between 2010 and 2012.
Madrid Train Bombing 2004 data set reflects the simultaneous, coordinated
bombings against the Cercanías commuter train system of Madrid, Spain,
on the morning of 11 March 2004.
On the other hand, the criminal networks we study are:
Project Caviar data set is the result of a unique investigation that targeted a
network of hashish and cocaine importers operating out of Montréal. The
network was targeted between 1994 and 1996 by a tandem investigation
uniting the Montréal Police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and other
national and regional law-enforcement agencies from various countries.
Project Ciel data set is based on a small drug importation network that was
importing liquid hashish from Jamaica to Montréal. This network was
targeted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Montréal Police
from May 1996 to June 1997.
Cocaine Dealing Natarajan dataset comes from an investigation into to a
large cocaine trafficking organization in New York City.
Cocaine Smuggling data set refers to four groups involved in cocaine
trafficking in Spain. Information comes from police wiretapping and
meetings registered by police investigations of these criminal organizations
between 2007 and 2009.
London Gang data set is about a London-based inner-city street gang, 20052009, operating from a social housing estate. Data comes from anonymized
police arrest and conviction for all confirmed members of the gang.
Montréal Street Gangs data set was obtained from the Montréal Police's
central intelligence base and was used to reconstruct the organization of
drug-distribution operations in Montréal North. These operations were
targeted during three separate investigations between 2004 and 2007 by the
Montréal Police.

Published by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB), 2021

9

Northeast Journal of Complex Systems (NEJCS), Vol. 3, No. 1 [2021], Art. 1

There are a handful of techniques in the literature to process intelligence
data and make it useful for analysis. For example, in (Alhajjar & Morse, 2020) and
(Alhajjar & Russell, 2019), the authors propose a new method for filtering
intelligence data related to terrorist networks. The project is based on the idea of
“collapsing” the different layered networks induced by several attributes of the
agents in question. The resulting network becomes the main object of study and
network centrality measures are performed therein.
An important challenge for social network analysts seeking to disrupt dark,
covert, or criminal networks through the removal of central participants of various
kinds is to address whether a fragment from a newly broken network still contains
all the necessary and relevant information and the context is not lost through this
operation (Everton, 2012).
Our aim in this paper is to use the repository of centrality measures to
highlight the structural differences between the two types of networks: criminal
versus terrorist networks. We use the data sets listed previously to showcase these
differences in a systematic way. Results and findings are recorded in the next
section.
5. Results
In this section, we apply centrality techniques and statistical measures to the 14
networks described in the previous section. The main goal here is two-fold; on one
hand, we show the similarities between the different criminal networks even though
they do not generally overlap in their operational activities. Likewise, we show the
similarities between the different terrorist networks that span multiple geographical
territories. On the other hand, we pinpoint the major differences between these two
types of networks on a microscopic and macroscopic structural level.
For the sake of brevity, we choose the following measures to compute: the
diameter, the average geodesic distance, the density, the average degree, the global
clustering coefficient, the average eigenvector centrality, and the maximum
betweenness centrality. Table 1 shows the values of these measures for the 8
terrorist networks, while Table 2 shows the corresponding values for the 6 criminal
networks.
For a cumulative view, we average all our findings for terrorist and criminal
networks separately. The results are shown in Table 3 below, where the reader can
easily spot the gap in values between the two types of networks.
For the sake of visualization, Figure 2 depicts a sample of each of the two
types of networks in question. Namely, we illustrate the topology of the 17
November Greece Bombing and the Cocaine Smuggling Spain data sets. Nodes
represent actors in the network and links represent relationships between them
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(kinship, friendship, cooperation, mentorship, etc.). The colors used are merely for
visual distinction between the different communities formed therein.
Table 1: Centrality measures for terrorist networks
Greece
Bombing

Australian
Christmas
Mali
Madrid
Embassy
Bali
Eve
Hamburg Jakarta Terrorist Train
Bombing Bombing Bombings Cell 9/11 Bombing Network Bombing

Diameter

4

7

7

7

8

12

7

8

Average
Geodesic
Distance

1.983

1.860

1.994

2.069

2.077

2.049

2.984

2.202

Density

0.286

0.319

0.256

0.235

0.159

0.101

0.106

0.128

Average
Degree

6

8.296

6.667

10.356

5.235

2.714

3.72

6.778

Global
Clustering
Coefficient

0.529

0.565

0.547

0.545

0.566

0.363

0.394

0.451

Average
Eigenvec.
Centrality

0.469

0.469

0.409

0.348

0.323

0.236

0.319

0.252

Maximum
Betweenness
Centrality

0.348

0.276

0.301

0.188

0.176

0.171

0.581

0.169

Table 2: Centrality measures for criminal networks

Project
Caviar

Project
Ciel

Cocaine
Dealing
Cocaine
Natarajan Smuggling
NYC
Spain

London
Gang

Montreal
Street
gang

Diameter

7

4

11

7

6

4

Average Geodesic
Distance

2.655

2.453

2.071

3.308

2.054

2.143

Density

0.034

0.117

0.106

0.073

0.220

0.131

Average Degree

3.727

2.8

2.857

3.647

11.667

4.457

Global Clustering
Coefficient

0.123

0.172

0.124

0.274

0.519

0.336

Average Eigenvec.
Centrality

0.044

0.176

0.164

0.201

0.405

0.311

Maximum
Betweenness
Centrality

0.637

0.641

0.887

0.495

0.109

0.211
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Table 3: Comparison of average measures
Terrorist Networks

Criminal Networks

Diameter

7.5

6.5

Average Geodesic Distance

2.152

2.447

Density

0.199

0.114

Average Degree

6.221

4.859

Global Clustering Coefficient

0.495

0.258

Average Eigenvec. Centrality

0.353

0.217

Maximum Betweenness Centrality

0.276

0.497

Figure 2: Visualization of the Greece bombing and Spain smuggling networks
6. Discussion
The results highlighted in the previous section hint at a multitude of similarities
between networks of the same type, yet a handful of structural differences between
terrorist and criminal networks. We aim at identifying these similarities/differences
in this section and give a plausible interpretation for their occurrence.
Considered separately, we remark that both terrorist and criminal networks
have a more-or-less similar average geodesic distance ranging between 2 and 3.

https://orb.binghamton.edu/nejcs/vol3/iss1/1
DOI: 10.22191/nejcs/vol3/iss1/1

12

Alhajjar et al.: Are Terrorist Networks Just Glorified Criminal Cells?

Also, the density of the networks falls within a small range of values. Recall that
the density measures the proportion of edges present in a graph (see the
Preliminaries section). Likewise, the global clustering coefficient, the average
eigenvector centrality, and the maximum betweenness centrality are comparable
within the same type of networks (see Table 1 and Table 2). It is worth mentioning
however that the diameter of the networks fluctuates in values between 4 and 12,
which is dependent, among other things, on the presence or the absence of low
degree nodes (irrelevant actors) in the corresponding networks.
When contrasted with each other on average, the analytical measures on
terrorist and criminal networks reveal surprising differences. Among these
measures, some are higher in value in terrorist networks and lower in criminal
networks, while the remaining ones are the other way around. Table 4 summarizes
the comparison between the corresponding values. We provide some fundamental
justification regarding this discrepancy:
• Terrorist networks reveal a low average geodesic distance, a high average
degree, and a high average eigenvector centrality. This supports the idea
that a typical member in terrorist networks maintains a high communication
level with other members of the same network, a factor considered crucial
in the success of coordinated attacks. The opposite is true for criminal
networks, i.e., a low communication level is maintained within a given
network which points to a hierarchical structure (tree-like) in the network.
• The density and the global clustering coefficient are higher in terrorist
networks than in criminal networks, which indicates that the relationships
between actors are tighter in terrorist networks. Moreover, this observation
implies that terrorists have a higher tendency to form cliques within their
networks.
• The maximum betweenness centrality is remarkably higher in criminal
networks. This suggests the presence of one or more focal actors who
control the information flow throughout the network, whereas information
is spread more evenly within terrorist networks.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, a systematic study between criminal and terrorist networks was
carried out from a network science perspective. We employed 14 different data sets
from publicly available sources to study structural characteristics of these networks.
Based on centrality and statistical analysis, we were able to infer that the two types
of networks are indeed not similar in the way they operate and as such, they should
not be treated alike in counter efforts.
In summary, each actor in a terrorist network is important and well
connected with the rest of the network. Therefore, the actors operate in a tightly
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Table 4: Summary of differences between networks
Terrorist Networks

Criminal Networks

Diameter

High

Low

Average Geodesic Distance

Low

High

Density

High

Low

Average Degree

High

Low

Global Clustering Coefficient

High

Low

Average Eigenvec. Centrality

High

Low

Maximum Betweenness Centrality

Low

High

knit team structure, i.e., in small groups of connected individuals. This fact explains
the increasing success rate of highly coordinated attacks by maintaining secrecy
and trust between clusters of actors from within the whole network.
On the contrary, low-level actors in a criminal network have little to no
influence within the network and rely heavily on their chain of command. Thus,
criminal networks exhibit a hierarchical structure in which powerful individuals
control the rhythm/flow of the operations and transfer information through multiple
layers of less influential actors.
Practitioners dealing with organized crime and terrorist networks have
developed views around the activities and causes leading individuals to join such
networks. There is a misconception in general that the two types of networks
resemble each other, the argument behind this statement being “bad guys are bad
regardless of what they do”.
Looking back at the original title of our work: Are Terrorist Networks Just
Glorified Criminal Cells? we hope that we conveyed enough analytical evidence to
answer this question in the negative. Namely, our results show that terrorist
networks have indeed many structural differences that set them apart from criminal
networks. Based on our thorough study, we recommend that counter terrorism
efforts take this matter into consideration and treat terrorist cells as “spread out”
clusters of actors. We strongly believe that going after the new version of Bin Laden
or the new version of Al Baghdadi (whoever they might be) is not the guaranteed
effective way to dismantle emerging terrorist groups, since such groups are
switching their operations into a decentralized fashion.
Moving forward, covert networks should be viewed as highly clustered
networks more so than tree-like structures. Hence, the mindset of the policy makers
and the security agencies involved in counter terrorism initiatives should veer from
targeting the main actor in a given network and more towards dismantling the set
of clusters, whether simultaneously or one cluster at a time.
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